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Strong reciprocity is considered here as the propensity to sacriﬁce resources to be kind or
to punish in response to prior acts, a behavior not simply reducible to self-interest and a
likely force behind human cooperation and sociality.The aimwas to capture emerging signs
of strong reciprocity in human ontogeny and across highly contrasted cultures. Three- and
5-year-oldmiddle classAmerican children (N = 162) were tested in a simple, multiple round,
three-way sharing game involving the child, a generous puppet, and a stingy puppet. At the
end of the game, the child was offered an opportunity to sacriﬁce some of her personal
gains to punish one of the puppets. By 3 years, American children demonstrate a willing-
ness to engage in costly punishment. However, only 5-year-olds show some evidence of
strong reciprocity by orienting their punishment systematically toward the stingy puppet.
Further analyses and three additional control conditions demonstrate that such propensity
is not simply reducible to (a) straight imitation, or (b) inequity aversion. To assess the rela-
tive universality of such development, a group of 5- to 6-year-old children from rural Samoa
(N = 14)were tested and compared to age and gender-matchedAmerican children. Samoan
children did not manifest the same propensity toward strong reciprocity. The results are
interpreted as pointing to (1) the developmental emergence of an ethical stance between
3 and 5 years of age, and (2) that the expression of such stance by young children could
depend on culture.
Keywords: strong reciprocity, costly punishment, cross-cultural psychology, sharing, egalitarianism, moral
reasoning
INTRODUCTION
Defectors of potential cooperation tend to be punished, even in
anonymous interactions and evenwhen such punishment is costly,
not rational in either long or short economic terms,with the caveat
that it can vary across cultures (Henrich et al., 2006; Henrich
and Henrich, 2007). Strong reciprocity captures the propensity
to sacriﬁce resources, either to reward or to punish, in response to
perceived kindness or un-kindness (Fehr et al., 2002). The ques-
tion of interest here iswhendoes such propensity start to emerge in
human ontogeny andwhat is its signiﬁcance in child development.
Recent evidence suggests that human pro-social tendencies are
deeply rooted in development, already present from the mid-
dle of the ﬁrst year of life, as in the case of infants detecting
pro-social versus anti-social acts perpetrated by third-party pro-
tagonists (Kuhlmeier et al., 2003; Hamlin et al., 2007). By their
second birthday, children manifest the explicit inclination to help
and collaborate with others (Warneken et al., 2007; Tomassello,
2008), as well as to display empathic responses toward suffering
others (Zahn-Waxler et al., 1992; Eisenberg and Fabes, 1998). It is
also by the second year of life that children begin to show explicit
attention to social norms (Kagan, 1988).
Drawing on an analogy with existing theories on human lan-
guage (Pinker, 2008), some theories postulate the existence of
a universal and innate moral instinct of the species, a moral
grammar (Hauser, 2006) unique to humans and deeply rooted
in the evolution of particular emotional responses (Haidt and
Joseph, 2004). However, the analogy with language remains
problematic (Dupoux and Jacob, 2007), particularly in view of
children’s slow developing sense of fairness or egalitarianism (i.e.,
inequity aversion, Fehr et al., 2008) and moral reasoning (Piaget,
1932; Kohlberg, 1981), both showing signiﬁcant variations across
cultures (Snarey, 1985; Rochat et al., 2009).
By 21months children are explicit about possession. Personal
pronouns and adjectives like “mine!” become part of the child’s
vocabulary as an index of explicit ownership over things, opening
up possibilities for sharing, negotiation, and bartering with others
(Faigenbaum, 2005). Research documents an important devel-
opmental progression in the sharing of rewards and resources.
Three-year-olds demonstrate marked self-maximizing (selﬁsh)
and self-interested tendencies when asked to share, as in the exam-
ple of distributive justice games (Lane and Coon, 1972; Hook,
1978). Cross-cultural studies show that self-maximizing tenden-
cies by 3-year-olds tend to be moderated by the social and physical
environment of the child. Self-interest is signiﬁcantly attenuated in
3-year-olds growing up in rural, more communal small-scale tra-
ditional societies of Fiji and Peru when compared to middle class
children from urban and industrial Brazil, China, or United States
(Rochat et al., 2009). However, despite these variations, it appears
that regardless of culture, there is a decrease in self-maximizing
tendencies in sharing between 3 and 5 year of age (Rochat et al.,
2009). By 5 years, children are reported to apply a strict equity
or egalitarianism principle to their distributions. Sharing and dis-
tributive justice are presumed to develop with the child’s ability
to reason in terms of proportion (Inhelder and Piaget, 1964),
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eventually leading them to apply principles of proportionality by
factoring relative work, effort, production, need, or starting wealth
from around 7 years of age (Damon, 1975).
At an agewhen childrenmight still be overwhelmingly drivenby
self-maximizing tendencies, they also appear capable of generating
social preferences and value judgments about others on the basis
of how they give. From 4 years of age, children base social judg-
ments on absolute quantities of a distributed good, for example
judging one of two puppets as “nicer” because it gives them more
valuable chips (McCrink et al., 2009). By 5 years, children begin to
show signs that they judge the relative niceness of the puppet based
on the proportion of the chips the puppet is willing to sacriﬁce, in
the same way that adults tend to judge whether a resource distri-
bution is more or less equitable based on proportional reasoning
(McCrink et al., 2009).
Recent evidence also suggests that by 3.5 years of age, even
when they are not themselves recipient of a distribution, children
demonstrate selective preference in their distribution of resources
based on past relations (Olson and Spelke, 2008). In their study,
Olson and Spelke asked 3- to 4-year-olds to help a doll distrib-
ute resources to other dolls that were described as either close
relations (in-group) or strangers (out-group); dolls that had or
had not previously shared with the distributing doll (direct reci-
procity); or dolls that did or did not previously share with other
dolls (indirect reciprocity). In this situation childrendemonstrated
tendencies suggestive of an early sensitivity to close relations aswell
as direct reciprocity (i.e., tit-for-tat exchanges) and indirect reci-
procity (long term pay-off/reputation based exchanges). Note that
all this is demonstrated even though the sharing game involves
puppet dolls and not real protagonists.
Although tendencies toward direct and indirect reciprocity are
both considered as foundational aspects of cooperation andappear
to“extend deep in human development”(Olson and Spelke, 2008),
it is not clear yet how such tendencies eventually develop tobecome
strong reciprocity, which represents a marked qualitative shift in
meaning. Strong reciprocity, as indexed by costly punishment,
entails the sacriﬁce material resources to punish another individ-
ual and is considered here as the expression of principled decisions
by the child. Engaging in costly punishment therefore requires the
child to forego personal gain to enforce a norm (e.g., for fairness)
that has been violated. In the willingness to sacriﬁcing her own
resources, the child demonstrates an ethical (principled) stance
toward others that is qualitatively different and presumably more
advanced than simple reciprocity (e.g., tit-for-tat reciprocation).
In addition, the foundational aspect of strong reciprocity needs to
be speciﬁed. For example, is it basedon the adoptionof somemoral
principle (what we call here an ethical stance), or might it rest
only on an early propensity toward inequity aversion as proposed
by Fehr et al. (2008)? Furthermore, little is known regarding the
inﬂuence of culture on the development leading children from a
reciprocity thatmight be direct or indirect to one that is strong, i.e.,
principled and presumably independent of future self-maximizing
rewards.
In this context, the question we asked is twofold: First, what
are the ontogenetic origins of strong reciprocity and second, what
might be the potential inﬂuence of culture in the expression of
such a tendency in children’s development?
As a general working hypothesis, we expected that strong
reciprocity (as expressed in selective costly punishment) would
develop in the preschool years, becoming evident by 5–6 years
when children are also documented as becoming proﬁcient and
complex readers of others’ minds (Wellman and Liu, 2004), a
development that is predictable across cultures (Callaghan et al.,
2005).
In a series of studies, we present evidence that ﬁrst signs of
strong reciprocity emerge by 5 years. However, we also provide
some evidence that contrary to our expectations, the expression
of strong reciprocity by 5- to 6-year-olds can vary depending on
culture (i.e., afﬂuent, urban United States versus rural, traditional,
and group-oriented Samoa, see Study 6).
GENERAL METHODOLOGY
In six different studies, children participated in a triadic (three-
way), multi-round sharing game in which they were asked to split
coins (poker chips of uniform size, shape, and color) between
themselves and two protagonists. To provide an incentive for play-
ing, prior to the onset of the game children visited a makeshift toy
store where the experimenter explained how accumulated coins
could be used to purchase various prizes (e.g., small toys and
stickers <$1 USD). Children were also informed that their shar-
ing partners could similarly spend their winnings. To ensure that
children had associated the coins with the ability to win prizes,
at several points throughout the game children were prompted to
explain how the coins worked.
Study 1 examined children’s sense of reciprocity by asking par-
ticipants to share coins with stingy and generous partners. Study 2
replicated the task and then expanded thismethodology to include
a more direct test of strong reciprocity, a costly punishment task
in which children could sacriﬁce material gains to punish one
(or both) of the sharing partners. Three controls (Studies 3–5)
assessedwhether childrenwere sensitive to the actions of the stingy
or generous puppets. Finally, based on the same procedure, a com-
parison with a group of same age Samoan children in Study 6
offered the opportunity to examine potential cross-cultural vari-
ations in the emerging expression of strong reciprocity (selective
costly punishment).
BASELINE ASSESSMENT
In order to assess children’s general sense of equitable and propor-
tional sharing, a pre-test was performed ﬁrst. Children were asked
to split nine coins between three identical toy ducks. We limited
the number of items shared to nine to avoid an exclusive reliance
on counting, which was presumably not yet in the register of the
younger children.
For the pre-test trial and the four sharing rounds that followed
(see description of the triadic sharing game below), an unfamiliar
female Experimenter sat at a table opposite the child and arranged
the valuables to be split (poker chips) in a circular formation on
the center of the table before instructing1 children to “split the
coins” (Figure 1). In the pre-test and in the triadic sharing game
that followed, children indicated ownership of the coins by placing
1“Split” was used in place of other instructions (e.g., “share” or “divide”) which are
often connotative of parsing a given object equitably, or into equal parts.
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FIGURE 1 | Experimental situation in the United States. Identical
puppets were animated in turn by the Experimenter during the three-way
sharing game (here the “stingy” puppet maximizes coins for himself).
them on the table in front of the intended recipient. After the
child conﬁrmed this distribution, the winnings were deposited
into banks (transparent plastic containers, each belonging to one
of the sharing protagonists) for safekeeping.
TRIADIC SHARING GAME
Following baseline pre-test, the child was tested in a triadic (three-
way) sharing game using nine pretend, yet valuable coins (poker
chips). In four successive trials, the child was asked to split the
coins in turn with two puppets that acted either with marked gen-
erosity or marked stinginess (Studies 1, 2, and 5). In three control
conditions, children participated in the same triadic share task, but
with a slight modiﬁcation. In Study 3 (Generous Control) children
interacted with two generous puppets. In Study 4 (Stingy Control)
children interacted with two stingy puppets. Finally, in Study 5
(Non-agentive Control), children interactedwith two passive pup-
pets. In this latter control condition, children are presented with
a pre-established distribution without seeing the puppets actively
sharing either stingily or generously.
The two identical,high-quality plushhand-puppets (43 cm tall)
dressed as kings sat at the table to the right and left of the child and
were animated by the Experimenter with the same vocalizations
and mannerisms throughout the experiment (Figure 1). In four
successive rounds, the two puppets always started, one sharing
generously (four coins to the other puppet, four coins to the child,
and only one to itself), and one sharing stingily (keeping seven
coins for itself, giving one to the other puppet, and only one to the
child). By sharing last, children observed the maximum effect of
the puppets’ generous or stingy behaviors.
In all studies,when it was the child’s turn,we recorded and ana-
lyzed as a dependent measure the total number of coins distributed
by the child to herself and to the two puppets as a function of the four
sharing rounds.
Researchers counterbalanced both the position of the charac-
ters (i.e., the location of the generous and stingy puppet relative
to the child) as well as which puppet shared ﬁrst to avoid the
potential of a side bias or order effect. Children were clearly and
unambiguously informed that each protagonist would keep and
could accumulate received coins to purchase attractive toys at a
makeshift toy store they visited prior to testing. To re-emphasize
the accumulative nature of the game, at the end of each round the
Experimenter asked the child to compare her bank with the banks
of the two puppets and determine which player had accumulated
the most coins.
SELECTIVE COSTLY PUNISHMENT TEST
In Studies 2–6, at the conclusion of the triadic sharing game chil-
dren were probed for signs of strong reciprocity in a ﬁnal costly
punishment test. After the last round of sharing, the Experimenter
instructed children to examine the contents of the three banks
and determine which player had the most coins. Next, the Exper-
imenter asked whether the outcome of the game was fair. It was
then proposed that as the “banker” of the game, the Experimenter
could take ﬁve coins away from a puppet of the child’s choosing,
but only if the child gave up one of her own coins. To underscore
the costly nature of this decision, the Experimenter reminded chil-
dren that coins sacriﬁced by the child or taken from the puppets
could not be used in the store. The Experimenter then asked if
the child would like to proceed. A child who responded “yes” had
to give the Experimenter one of her own coins before identifying
the puppet that should be punished2. The Experimenter offered a
chance for the child to engage in costly punishment again by ask-
ing if she would like to sacriﬁce another coin (i.e., “Would you like
to give me another coin and I can take ﬁve coins away from one
of the kings?”). This procedure repeated until the child declined
to offer a coin, or until one of the banks was emptied. For the
dependent measure, we recorded the number of coins sacriﬁced to
punish each puppet.
PARTICIPANTS
Except where noted in Study 6 (cross-cultural comparison), we
sampled children from predominantly middle- to upper-middle
class families living in metro-Atlanta, GA, USA (pop: >5 mil-
lion). In accordance with our IRB-approved protocol, children
were enrolled into the study through the consent of parents, who
were invited by phone and e-mail to participate.Half of the partici-
pants completed the study at a university research lab.We recruited
other children from small after-school programs and pre-schools
less than 3 km from the university campus. When appropriate, we
obtained additional consent from teachers and school administra-
tors. Table 1 provides descriptive statistics of the participants in
Studies 1–6.
STUDY 1 (CHILD–STINGY–GENEROUS TRIADIC SHARE
WITHOUT COSTLY PUNISHMENT)
HYPOTHESES
On the basis of prior studies that have found age-related trends
in egalitarian sharing behavior (Fehr et al., 2008; Rochat et al.,
2009), we hypothesized that 3- and 5-year-olds would differ in
2The word “punishment” was not used to explain this task to participants in an
effort to avoid biasing children toward participating.
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Table 1 | Descriptive statistics of participants in Studies 1–6.
Males (N ) Females (N ) Mean age±SD
(in months)
Study 1 (Child–Stingy–GenerousTriadic Share without
Costly Punishment), N=36a
3-year-olds (N =18) 10 8 44.27±4.85
5-year-olds (N =18) 11 7 67.33±5.85
Study 2 (Child–Stingy–GenerousTriadic Share and Costly
Punishment), N=66
3-year-olds (N =33) 18 15 42.95±4.89
5-year-olds (N =33) 18 15 64.15±4.90
Study 3 (Generous Control withTriadic Share and Costly
Punishment), N=24
3-year-olds (N =12) 4 8 44.25±6.03
5-year-olds (N =12) 4 8 65.89±7.68
Study 4 (Stingy Control withTriadic Share and Costly Punishment),
N=24
3-year-olds (N =12) 7 5 45.00±4.35
5-year-olds (N =12) 5 7 60.92±5.90
Study 5 (Non-Agentive Control withTriadic Share and Costly
Punishment), N=18b
5-year-olds (N =18) 9 9 64.17±3.62
Study 6 (Cross-Cultural Comparison of us and Samoan 5-Year-Old
Children), N=28c
Samoa (N =14) 7 7 68.30±5.83
US (N =14) 7 7 65.18±5.75
For 3-year-olds in all studies, participants ranged between 34 and 50months and
5-year-olds ranged between 58 and 70months. aStudy 1: two participants were
omitted on the basis that they did not complete the study, yielding an attrition
rate of 6%. bTo control for the possibility that inequity aversion was driving the
selective costly punishment results amongst older children, Study 5 sampled only
5-year-olds. cThe US children included in Study 6 were randomly selected from
the sample of 5-year-olds who participated in Study 2.
their distributionof the coins,particularlywith regard to the stingy
and generous puppets. As for rationale, we considered that if reci-
procity guides children’s sharing, they should give more coins to
the generous rather than the stingy puppet (who violates an expec-
tation of fairness) when it is their turn to split. We hypothesized
that this tendency should become more marked as a function of
the four sharing rounds as children observe the consistency of the
generous and stingy puppets’ actions, and that this expression of
reciprocity should be evident by 5 years of age and not earlier.
RESULTS
We analyzed the number of coins (out of nine) distributed to
each protagonist as the dependent measure in a 4 (round)× 3
(recipient)× 2 (age)× 2 (gender) mixed-design ANOVA. Chil-
dren’s performance on the three-way sharing pre-test, coded as
a binomial variable indicating whether or not children split coins
equally (3–3–3) between the three dolls, was included as covariate
to control for potential differences in children’s abilities to reason
proportionally. Neither gender nor pre-test performances were
found to be signiﬁcant factors,F1,31 = 1.57 and 0.622, respectively.
Analyses yielded a three-way interaction of round, recipi-
ent, and age, F6,29 = 2.57, p = 0.040, η2 = 0.080. Taking into
consideration only the child as recipient, in a follow-up test
to assess children’s self-maximizing tendencies over the course
of the sharing game we observed a signiﬁcant main effect of
round, F3,32 = 3.41, p = 0.029, η2 = 0.179. Overall, as a func-
tion of round, children of both ages tended to accumulate more
coins for themselves. However, note that there was a marginally
signiﬁcant interaction of round by age (F3,32 = 2.44, p = 0.082,
η2 = 0.078) suggesting a stronger trend for younger children.
The mean difference in the number of coins distributed to
the child between Rounds 1 and 4 was greater for 3-year-olds
(MD± SE= 2.66± 0.918, p< 0.01 based on Bonferroni-adjusted
comparisons) and not statistically signiﬁcant for 5-year-olds
(MD± SD= 0.301± 0.664).
Additional follow-up tests assessed children’s treatment of the
two puppets across the four rounds of sharing. Amongst 3-
year-olds we observed no signiﬁcant main effects or interactions
of round and recipient. On average, these children distributed
roughly the same number of coins to the stingy (M ± SD=
2.05± 1.60) and generous (M ± SE= 1.98± 1.76) puppet in
each round (see Figure 2, left panel). Therefore, 3-year-olds
did not express any selective discrimination between the two
protagonists. In contrast, 5-year-olds increasingly discriminated
between stingy and generous characters as a function of rounds
(see Figure 2, right panel). There was a signiﬁcant inter-
action of round by recipient for 5-year-olds (F3,15 = 2.91,
p = 0.037, η2 = 0.084). Although the mean difference in the
number of coins given to the generous and stingy was not
signiﬁcant in Round 1 (MD± SE= 0.048± 0.387), children
signiﬁcantly favored the generous over the stingy puppet in
Round 2 (MD± SE= 0.667± 0.226), Round 3 (MD± SE=
0.952± 0.337), and Round 4 (MD± SE= 1.10± 0.388), all
p< 0.05 based on pairwise comparisons, Bonferroni-adjusted).
Together, the results of the triadic sharing game indicated
that sensitivity to the relative generosity or stinginess of the
sharing partners, as a function of round, is evident by 5-year-olds
only. Five-year-old children in our sample maximized their gains
(although to a lesser extent than their 3-year-old counterparts)
while simultaneously becoming more discriminating in their dis-
tributions to the stingy over the generous puppet. These ﬁndings
indicate that 5- but not 3-year-olds deal with sharing partners
depending on their character (generous or not) in acts of reci-
procity and in response to acts that defy norms of fairness. How-
ever, without evidence of self-sacriﬁce and costly punishment on
the part of the child, it is difﬁcult to determine whether chil-
dren are able to by-pass mere reciprocity to also show signs of
strong reciprocity. The next study was devised to test for this
possibility.
STUDY 2 (CHILD–STINGY–GENEROUS TRIADIC SHARE WITH
COSTLY PUNISHMENT)
In a more direct test of strong reciprocity, we repeated with 66
children (33 three-year-olds and 33 ﬁve-year-olds, see Table 1) the
Triadic Sharing game described in the ﬁrst study, adding a follow-
up condition (the Costly Punishment task) to determine whether
children would be willing to sacriﬁce some of their own accumu-
lated coins to punish one of the two protagonists, particularly the
stingy, unfair puppet.
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FIGURE 2 | Children’s distributions in triadic sharing in Study 1.
Vertical axis represents mean number of coins (maximum nine)
distributed by 3-year-olds (left panel) and 5-year-olds (right panel) to each
protagonist (child, stingy, and generous) as a function of round (1–4). The
horizontal line represents absolute equity (three coins). Bars represent
±1 SE.
HYPOTHESES
We expected to replicate the ﬁndings in Study 1 regarding the four
rounds of three-way sharingwith the stingy and generous puppets.
We predicted that 5-year-olds would show reciprocity compared
to 3-year-oldswho should self-maximizemore and be less selective
regarding the stingy or generous character of the puppets. In rela-
tion to strong reciprocity, in the additional costly punishment task
we expected 5-year-olds to engage in costly sacriﬁce to punish the
stingy protagonist when offered the opportunity, going above and
beyond reciprocity, and thus starting to take a principled ethical
stance (see introduction for developmental rationale).
RESULTS
As in Study 1, we analyzed the number of coins (out of 9) distrib-
uted to each player as the dependent measure in a 4 (round)× 3
(recipient)× 2 (age)× 2 (gender) mixed-design ANOVA. Neither
gender (F1,61 = 0.628) nor children’s performance on the three-
way pre-test, included here as a covariate (F1,61 = 0.446), were
found to be signiﬁcant factors.
Results yielded a signiﬁcant three-way interaction of round,
recipient, and age, F6,59 = 3.73, p< 0.01, η2 = 0.531. In a
follow-up test to assess children’s degree of self-maximizing and
considering only what children gave to themselves, we observed
a main effect of round, F3,62 = 7.57, p< 0.01, η2 = 0.544. On
average, both 3- and 5-year-olds increased the number of coins
given to themselves over the course of the game, from Round 1
(M ± SD= 3.97± 2.11) to Round 4 (M ± SD= 4.91± 2.26).
With regard to their treatment of the two puppets, over
the four sharing rounds we found no signiﬁcant trends for 3-
year-olds. These younger children did not differentiate signif-
icantly between the stingy (M ± SD= 2.24± 1.50) and gener-
ous (M ± SD= 2.20± 1.58) puppets at any point in the game
(Figure 3, left panel). In contrast, as in Study 1, 5-year-olds
discriminated between the puppets. For these children, a signif-
icant interaction of round and recipient (F3,20 = 5.65, p< 0.01,
η2 = 0.361) points to a preferential treatment of the generous over
the stingy protagonist. As predicted, the mean difference in the
number of coins distributed to the generous and stingy puppet
was signiﬁcant in Round 2 (MD± SE= 0.635± 0.260), Round
3 (MD± SE= 0.458± 0.254), and Round 4 (MD± SE= 0.667±
0.278), all p< 0.01 based on Bonferroni-adjusted pairwise
comparisons. This analysis of the recipient by round interaction
suggests that as the game progressed, 5-year-olds gave more to
themselves at the expense of the stingy rather than the generous
puppet. The disparity between puppets (particularly in Rounds 2–
4, see Figure 3, right panel) is likely a result of the child penalizing
the stingy protagonist by giving more to herself rather than the
child sacriﬁcingher owncoins to givemore to the generouspuppet.
www.frontiersin.org December 2011 | Volume 2 | Article 353 | 5
Robbins and Rochat Emerging signs of strong reciprocity
FIGURE 3 | Children’s distributions in triadic sharing in Study 2.
Vertical axis represents mean number of coins (maximum nine)
distributed by 3-year-olds (left panel) and 5-year-olds (right panel) to each
protagonist (child, stingy, and generous) as a function of round (1–4). The
horizontal line represents absolute equity (three coins). Bars represent
±1 SE.
In the follow-up costly punishment task, the inclination to
engage in costly punishment did not differ between age groups:
76% of 3-year-olds (N = 25) and 91% of 5-year-olds (N = 30)
opted to punish at least once. Because the puppets differed with
regard to their stingy or generous acts, we hypothesized that fair-
minded children should be less inclined to equally punish both
puppets. A two-tailed Fisher’s exact test compared the percentage
of children in each age group who punished in successive attempts
both puppets. Sixty-four-percent of 3-year-olds did so, compared
to only 17% of 5-year-olds, p< 0.01.
To further investigate the selective orientation of children’s
costly punishment as a speculative expression of strong reciprocity,
we used a linear regression model with the child’s age (in months)
to predict (out of all coins sacriﬁced) the percentage of coins given
up to punish the stingy puppet. We observed a signiﬁcant, moder-
ate to strong association (R_1, 552 = 0.320, p< 0.01) between age
and punishment orientation. These data suggest that as a function
of age, when children sacriﬁce coins, they are increasingly selective
in orienting their punishment toward the stingy puppet. Note that
by 60months, fewer children punish both puppets and no children
punish the generous puppet only (Figure 5, left panel).
Collectively, the results of the costly punishment task indicate
that unlike 3-year-olds, 5-year-olds selectively orient punishment
toward the stingy character.We interpret this as ﬁrst signs of strong
reciprocity.
ALTERNATIVE HYPOTHESES AND FURTHER ANALYSES
Regarding the triadic sharing game, the differing allocations by the
child to the two protagonists could rest on straight imitation (e.g.,
copying identically the actions of the stingy or generous puppet).
Children might also focus on the overall unequal accumulation of
coins in the banks that were transparent, hence public. Because the
generous puppet always receives the least amount of coins prior to
the child’s turn, the number of coins in this bank is typically less
than that of the other two protagonists. It is therefore possible that
children gave more coins to the generous puppet in order to rec-
tify this perceptual inequity (inequity aversion hypothesis), rather
than as a means of expressing approval or spite for the puppet’s
generous versus stingy actions (ethical stance hypothesis).
To test these two alternative accounts, we identiﬁed 13 poten-
tial ways for children to distribute coins during the triadic share.
To probe the alternative imitation account, we analyzed the extent
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to which children imitated the stingy and generous puppet in a
strict “tit-for-tat” manner (i.e., giving to each of puppet the exact
number of coins that the child’s received from each) during any
of four rounds of triadic sharing. We found that such emulation
of either puppet was evident only for a small minority of children
at both ages (22% of 3-year-olds and only 5% of 5-year-olds).
There was no signiﬁcant age difference in this trend based on
chi-square calculations (p = 0.143). We therefore conclude that
straight imitation alternative cannot account for our results.
To probe the inequity aversion hypothesis we reasoned that if
children are responding based on a perceived perceptual inequity,
then the most common sharing strategies should be those in
which children favor the generous puppet to level the number
of coins in the three banks (generous-oriented sharing). Chil-
dren were only coded as engaging in generous-oriented sharing if
they gave systematically more to the generous compared to either
the self or the stingy puppet. Self-maximizing or stingy oriented
strategieswere therefore incompatiblewith such sharing (mutually
exclusive). Analysis reveals that generous-oriented strategies were
uncommon, with 13% 3-year-olds and only 8% of 5-year-olds
sharing this way3. The inequity aversion hypothesis does not seem
to hold.
Finally, in relation to costly punishment, we analyzed whether
children engaged in costly sacriﬁce not to punish proper,but rather
to re-establish equal distribution among the protagonists (inequity
aversion hypothesis). We calculated an index of inequity by com-
puting for each participant the proportion of coins in each bank at
the end of the four round distributions (total accumulated coins in
stingy’s bank/(total accumulation of coins in child’s bank+ total
accumulated coins in generous’s bank).As a result, and considering
mathematical lower and upper limits, the index of inequity could
vary between a minimum value of 0.68 and a maximum value
of 2.86, with greater values indicating greater levels of inequity
beneﬁting the stingy puppet (maximum possible accumulation
for the stingy puppet which was 80 coins). We reasoned that the
inequity aversion hypothesis would be supported if the index of
inequity (as it emerges at the end of the four rounds of distrib-
ution and depending only on the child’s distribution) would (1)
positively correlate with each child’s inclination to engage in costly
punishment and (2) would positively correlate with each child’s
inclination to punish the doll that typically ended up with the
most coins (i.e., the stingy puppet).
Non-parametric correlation test between our index of inequity
and whether or not the child opted toward costly punishment
yielded non-signiﬁcant results for both age groups, respectively
rs31 =−0.15 for 3-year-olds and rs31 =−0.25 for 5-year-olds.
Parametric correlation tests between index of inequity and the
proportion of all coins sacriﬁced to punish the stingy puppet, also
yielded non-signiﬁcant results for both age groups, respectively
r31 = 0.018 for 3-year-olds and r31 = 0.287 for 5-year-olds. From
these results, we conclude that the inequity aversion hypothesis
cannot readily account for our costly punishment results.
3Percentages for the sharing patterns in Study 1 were comparable and did not differ
signiﬁcantly from those reported here for Study 2.
To assert that children are indeed more or less sensitive to
the stingy or generous character of the puppets, we performed
three control experiments that are presented next. Speciﬁcally, we
repeated the triadic share and costly punishment task with three
new cohorts of children sharing in turn with either (a) two iden-
tical generous puppets (Study 3), (b) two identical stingy puppets
(Study 4), or (c) puppets that were non-agentive in the splitting of
coins (Study 5).
STUDY 3 (GENEROUS CONTROL TRIADIC SHARE AND
COSTLY PUNISHMENT)
To determine whether children are sensitive to the generous char-
acter of the puppet, we ran a ﬁrst control sampling 24 children
(12 three-year-olds and 12 ﬁve-year-olds, see Table 1) who played
the Triadic Sharing game and Costly Punishment task described
previously, but with identically generous puppets.
HYPOTHESES
Regarding the four rounds of three-way sharing with the two
generous puppets,we anticipated that 5-year-olds would show evi-
dence of reciprocity by decreasing their degree of self-maximizing,
compared to 3-year-olds who should persist in self-maximizing
regardless of both puppets’ generous characters. In relation to the
costly punishment task, because both puppets acted with marked
generosity (hence negating any need to adopt a principled “ethi-
cal stance”), we expected a lesser frequency of costly punishment
compared to Study 2. Furthermore, we predicted that if punish-
ment did occur, it would not be oriented systematically toward
either one of the generous puppets.
RESULTS
Data were analyzed using the same 4 (round)× 3 (recipient)× 2
(age)× 2 (gender) mixed-design ANOVA described previously.
Because children distributed coins between themselves and iden-
tical generous protagonists, the potential recipients for this study
included the child, the left-side puppet, and the right-side pup-
pet. Gender and children’s performance on the three-way pre-test
(included as a covariate) were both non-signiﬁcant, F1,19 = 0.479
and 0.373, respectively.
Analysis yielded a signiﬁcant interaction of recipient and
age, F2,18 = 4.83, p = 0.021, η2 = 0.349. Contrasts reveal that as
recipients and with regard to self-maximizing tendencies, 3-year-
olds gave more coins to themselves (M ± SD= 4.17± 2.02) than
did 5-year-olds (M ± SD= 2.27± 1.27), F1,19 = 5.24, p = 0.034,
η2 = 0.216. Three-year-olds also tended to give more coins
to themselves than to either the left (M ± SD= 2.18± 1.97)
or right (M ± SD= 2.76± 1.67) puppets, both p< 0.05 based
on Bonferroni-adjusted pairwise comparisons. Amongst 5-
year-olds there was a non-signiﬁcant trend for children to
give more coins to the left (M ± SD= 3.40± 1.79) and to
the right puppet (M ± SD= 3.34± 1.56) than to themselves
(M ± SD= 2.27± 1.28), suggesting that these children were
sharing with almost absolute equity. Neither 3- nor 5-year-
olds exhibited signs of a side bias by preferentially giv-
ing signiﬁcantly more coins to the right versus the left-
side puppet (see Figure 4, left and right panels, respec-
tively).
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FIGURE 4 | Children’s distributions in triadic sharing in Study 3
(Generous Control), Study 4 (Stingy Control) and Study 5
(Non-Agentive Control). Children split coins between themselves and
two puppets that were either identically generous (Study 3), or stingy
(Study 4), or were passive recipients of the game (Study 5). Vertical axis
represents mean number of coins (maximum 9) distributed by
3-year-olds (left panel) and 5-year-olds (right panel) to each recipient
collapsed across round. Note that to control for the possible effect of
inequity aversion in older children, only 5-year-olds were tested in
Study 5.
Note that despite these developmental differences, both 3- and
5-year-olds in this Studywere on average less self-maximizing than
their counterparts in Study 2. We computed a “self-maximizing”
score by averaging the number of coins given to the child across
the four sharing rounds and used this score as the dependent mea-
sure in an independent samples t -test to compare self-maximizing
across the two studies. Overall, children in Study 3 (Generous
Control) gave signiﬁcantly fewer coins (M ± SD= 3.21± 1.92) to
themselves than did children in Study 2 (Stingy–Generous Triadic
Share, M ± SD= 4.53± 1.86), t 88 = 2.95, p< 0.01 (one-tail).
These ﬁndings suggest that even when sharing with identical
generous protagonists, 3-year-old children persist in their maxi-
mization of personal gains; their sharing in this control condition
was akin to the self-maximizing observed in 3-year-olds in both
Studies 1 and 2. In contrast, and conﬁrming our hypothesis, 5-
year-olds showed clear signs of reciprocity with the puppets by
sharing more generously and self-maximizing signiﬁcantly less
compared to Study 2.
In the absence of any overtly unfair sharing on the part of
the two puppets, we did not expect children at either age to
engage in costly punishment. Owing to the identical character
of the puppets, if costly punishment occurred, we expected the
orientation of such punishment to be at chance. A series of
Fisher’s exact tests supported these predictions. Approximately
half of 3- (58%, N = 7) and 5-year-olds (42%, N = 5) engaged
in costly punishment; overall, this cohort punished signiﬁcantly
less frequently than did children in Study 2, Fisher’s exact test:
p< 0.01 (one-tail). Furthermore, when children punished they
did so without clearly aligning punishment toward one puppet.
Note that 71% of 3-year-olds and 60% of 5-year-olds punished
both puppets. Linear regression demonstrated that the associa-
tion between children’s age (in months) and the percentage of
coins (out of all coins sacriﬁced) given to punish the left pup-
pet was non-signiﬁcant, R_1, 102 = 0.02 (Figure 5, center panel).
That 5-year-olds show no signs of selective costly punishment is
in sharp contrast to the ﬁndings reported in Study 2. We spec-
ulate that when they punish in this control study, children of
both age groups act instead of punishing proper to prolong the
playful exchange with the Experimenter (ludic inertia, see General
Discussion).
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In all, Study 3 conﬁrms that between 3 and 5 years, children
become more sensitive to the generous character of sharing pro-
tagonists, aligning with their generous tendencies in acts of reci-
procity. Arguably, in the absence of any overt violation of fairness
norms on the part of the two generous puppets, children were not
motivated to adopt an ethical stance, opting to engage in selective
costly punishment only at chance levels. For further control, in
Study 4, we repeated the experiment with two stingy puppets.
STUDY 4 (STINGY CONTROL WITH TRIADIC SHARE AND
COSTLY PUNISHMENT)
To assert that children are indeed sensitive to the stingy charac-
ter of the puppet, in a second control condition we sampled 24
children (12 three-year-olds and 12 ﬁve-year-olds, see Table 1)
who played the Triadic Sharing Game and Costly Punishment task
described previously with two identically stingy puppets.
HYPOTHESES
Regarding the four rounds of three-way sharing with identical
stingy puppets,we expected that if 5-year-olds are engaging in reci-
procity, they should increase their tendency to self-maximize,more
closely resembling 3-year-olds and giving themselves more coins
compared to Study 2. For the costly punishment task, we antic-
ipated at both ages no evidence of selective punishment toward
either one of the two puppets owing to the identical nature of
their characters (i.e., stingy character in both).
RESULTS
Because children distributed coins between themselves and identi-
cal stingy protagonists, potential recipients of sharing included the
child, the left puppet, and the right puppet. Triadic share data were
analyzed using a 4 (round)× 3 (recipient)× 2 (age)× 2 (gender)
mixed-designANOVA. Gender and performance on the three-way
pre-test (included as a covariate)werenon-signiﬁcant,F1,18 = 2.82
and 0.565, respectively.
A main effect of recipient (F2,17 = 55.8, p< 0.01, η2 = 0.112)
demonstrates that 3- and 5-year-olds were similar in how they
distributed coins amongst the three protagonists (Figure 4, left
and right panels, respectively). Children at both ages maxi-
mized their gains, giving themselves on average 6.5 (roughly
72%) of the nine coins. Mean differences indicate that children
gave signiﬁcantly more coins to themselves than to either the
left (MD± SE= 5.45± 0.402) or right (MD± SE= 5.42± 0.452)
puppet, both p< 0.01 based on Bonferroni-adjusted pairwise
comparisons. Neither 3- nor 5-year-olds exhibited signs of a side
bias by preferentially giving signiﬁcantly more coins to the right
versus the left-side puppet (see Figure 4, left and right panels,
respectively).
FIGURE 5 | Coins sacrificed to punish during the costly punishment task
in Studies 2–4. Vertical axis represents the proportion (%) of the total coins
sacriﬁced by each child to punish the stingy puppet (Study 2, left panel) or the
left-side puppet (Study 3, center, and Study 4, right panel) as a function of the
child’s age in months. The horizontal line represents equal punishment toward
the two puppets.
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Children’s degree of self-maximizing in this condition was ele-
vated even above levels noted in Study 2. To compare across
studies, we ﬁrst computed a “self-maximization” score by aver-
aging together the number of coins distributed to the child across
the four sharing rounds. This value was entered as the depen-
dent measure in an independent samples t -test. Regardless of age,
when in the presence of two stingy protagonists children give sig-
niﬁcantly more coins to themselves (M ± SD= 6.52± 1.33) than
in situations in which they distribute resources with a stingy
and a generous puppet, as in Study 2 (M ± SD= 4.53± 1.86),
t 88 = 4.83, p< 0.01 (one-tail).
Consistentwith the generous control condition of Study 3,both
3- and 5-year-olds were at chance regarding the inclination to
engage in costly punishment. Overall, children in this cohort were
signiﬁcantly less likely to punish than were children in Study 2,
Fisher’s exact test: p< 0.01 (one-tail). Furthermore, children who
punished were non-selective in their orientation of punishment:
67%of 3-year-olds and 83%of 5-year-olds punished both puppets
equally often. A linear regression model testing the relationship
between children’s age (in months) and the percentage (out of
total sacriﬁced coins) given to punish the left puppet yielded a
non-signiﬁcant association, R_1, 152 = 0.05 (see Figure 5, right
panel).
In all, the results conﬁrmour prediction that when sharingwith
two stingy characters,both 3- and 5-year-old childrendemonstrate
strong self-maximizing tendencies. As in Study 3 (generous con-
trol) but in contrast to Study 2 (stingy and generous partners),
5-year-olds show no sign of selective costly punishment when
agreeing to sacriﬁce one of their coins at the end of the sharing
game.
To further control that 5-year-olds do construe and factor the
stingy and generous characters of the puppets as sharing agents,
we performed a ﬁnal control with non-agentive (passive) puppets.
The rationalewas that if 5-year-oldswere only considering the out-
come of the sharing (i.e., unequal coin distribution independent
of the agentive character of the puppet), we should replicate the
ﬁndings of Study 2. If not, the strong reciprocity (ethical stance)
hypothesis would ﬁnd further support to account for the behavior
of 5-year-olds.
STUDY 5 (NON-AGENTIVE CONTROL WITH TRIADIC SHARE
AND COSTLY PUNISHMENT)
In a ﬁnal control we tested the possibility that sharing outcome
(e.g., the number of coins in the banks at the end of the Tri-
adic Sharing game) rather than the character and agency of the
puppets could account for signs of strong reciprocity. In Study
5, children playing the same Triadic Sharing game described pre-
viously were presented with a pre-established distribution, never
seeing the puppets actually sharing either stingily or generously
but resting inanimate in front of the child. Prior to the child’s
turn to split the coins, the Experimenter displayed three groups of
coins on a tray, one for each of the three protagonists. The coins
were presented in the same ratios as in Studies 1and 2. Thus, in
one turn the “stingy” puppet received four coins while the child
and “generous” puppet received only one each, and in another
turn the “generous” puppet received one coin while the child and
“stingy” puppet each received four coins. As in the previous stud-
ies, we counterbalanced the location of the two puppets relative
to the child as well as the order in which the stingy and gener-
ous distributions were presented. When it was the child’s turn,
the child actively distributed as in the other studies. At the end of
the Triadic Sharing game children participated in the same Costly
Punishment task described previously. Because in Study 2 selec-
tive costly punishment oriented toward the stingy protagonist was
only observed in older children, we limited our sample in this new
control condition to only 5-year-olds (see Table 1).
HYPOTHESIS
Following the rationale of this control (see above) and based on the
strong reciprocity hypothesis demonstrated in 5-year-olds (Study
2), we expected signiﬁcantly less signs of oriented costly pun-
ishment in this non-agentive, passive puppet condition (no clear
agentive character of the puppets).
RESULTS
Once again, triadic share data were analyzed using a 4 (round)× 3
(recipient) mixed-designANOVA. On the basis of our earlier ﬁnd-
ings, gender and the pre-test were omitted as factors in analysis.
Results yielded a main effect of recipient, F2,14 = 5.566, p = 0.017,
η2 = 0.263. On average children gave signiﬁcantly more coins
to themselves (M = 4.521, SD= 0.484) than to either the stingy
(M = 2.118, SD= 0.313) or generous (M = 2.361, SD= 0.264),
both p< 0.05 based on Bonferroni-adjusted pairwise compar-
isons. Unlike their counterparts in Study 2, children in this control
condition were less self-maximizing and did not discriminate
between the two non-agentive puppets (Figure 4, right panel).
With regards to the costly punishment task, a binomial test
revealed that signiﬁcantly more children (N = 14, or 78%) opted
to punish than not, p = 0.015 (one-tail). This value did not differ
signiﬁcantly from the 91% of 5-year-olds who opted to punish in
Study 2 based on a Fisher’s exact test.
However, differences emerged with regard to the selectivity of
punishment. In this control condition, 7 of 14 children (50%)
punished both puppets. In contrast, children in Study 2 were
more selective: 17% of children punished both puppets, whereas
the majority (83%) were signiﬁcantly above chance levels in their
punishment of only one puppet, p< 0.05. In a more direct Fisher’s
exact test of these two studies, our results show a signiﬁcant
trend by which children in Study 2 were more likely to ori-
ent punishment toward only one puppet than were children in
the current control, p< 0.05. However, when exclusive punish-
ment of one puppet did occur, results show that, as in Study
2, it was oriented toward the stingy protagonist. Of the chil-
dren who sacriﬁced coins to punish only one puppet, 100% of
children in Study 2 and 86% of children in the present con-
trol oriented this punishment toward the stingy puppet. The
percentage of coins sacriﬁced to punish the stingy puppet was
also similar between Study 2 (M ± SD= 0.827± 0.285) and the
present control (M ± SD= 0.680± 0.337), t 42 = 1.334, p = 0.193
(two-tailed). In short, signiﬁcantly more children punished both
puppets in the control compared to Study 2. However, when chil-
dren opted to punish only one puppet, in both studies themajority
of children punished the stingy protagonist.
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As in Study 2, to determine whether punishment oriented
toward the stingy protagonist could be predicted by the total accu-
mulated coins in eachof the three banks,we correlated our index of
inequity aversion with the percentage of coins sacriﬁced to pun-
ish the stingy puppet (see Study 2 for formulation). Consistent
with the results of Study 2, this relationship was non-signiﬁcant,
r(14)= 0.023, suggesting that the differing amounts of coins in
each recipient’s bank at the end of the fourth round did not predict
selective punishment toward the stingy character.
These results suggest that in the absence of any agency or
explicit reference to the character of the two puppets, children
were signiﬁcantly less inclined to orient their punishment solely
to the stingy or the generous protagonist, in contrast to what we
found in Study 2. Furthermore, in both studies, when children
opted to punish the Stingy puppet at least once, this tendency
was not predicted by the relative number of coins in each recipi-
ent’s bank at the end of the game. We therefore conclude that the
inequity aversion hypothesis cannot account for our results.
STUDY 6 (CROSS-CULTURAL COMPARISON OF US AND
SAMOAN 5-YEAR-OLDS)
Egalitarianism and responses to unfair or inequitable acts might
be deeply rooted in human evolutionary history (Fehr et al., 2008;
Olson and Spelke, 2008). Such claims call for further cross-cultural
comparisons that would conﬁrm the universality of strong reci-
procity as they emerge in human ontogeny.We had the rare oppor-
tunity to test a sample of 5- to 6-year-olds living in a small rural and
traditional Polynesian village of Samoa in the South Paciﬁc (see
description below). Here we present ﬁndings for both the triadic
share and costly punishment replicating the procedure outlined
in Study 2. We compared Samoan children with age and gender-
matched children from our sample of American 5-year-olds in
Study 2. The rationale was to probe the role of highly contrasted
cultural contexts on children’s early expression of strong reci-
procity and to assess the extent to which such development might
be universal.
SAMOAN CHILDREN’S CULTURAL CONTEXT
Children were recruited from the village of Faga (population
approximately 500) on the East coast of the island of Savai’i
(population approximately 50,000) of independent Samoa (pop-
ulation approximately 180,000, with a GDP nominal per capita
of $2,608 USD, as opposed to $46,900 in the United States).
Samoa is at the heart of Polynesia and still maintains strict ances-
tral Polynesian traditions despite successive colonial dominations
by the British, Germans, and New-Zealanders, notwithstanding a
widespread conversion to Christian churches of almost all denom-
inations starting the middle of the nineteenth Century. Gaining
its political independence in 1962, and despite years of Western
inﬂuence and governance, Samoa has managed to uphold strong
traditions of collective living organized around a highly hierarchi-
cal chief (“Mataï”) system that is typical of Polynesian culture. In
Samoa, this system ismaintained in arguably its purest formwithin
the Polynesian context of the South Paciﬁc (Shore, 1982; O’Meara,
1990). Samoan culture and societal organization is a good example
of what is sometimes characterized as“vertical”as opposed to“hor-
izontal” or “egalitarian” collectivism (Triandis and Gelfand, 1998).
Children were tested in the village of Faga, which engages in
horticulture, ﬁshing, and marine foraging for survival and as a
means of small cash revenue, aside from remittance money sent
from family members living and working abroad, primarily in
New Zealand. Before children attend school (at around age three
to ﬁve), they typically spend the day with their immediate and
extended family, playing outdoors with other young children, or
observing alongside adults as theyperform their daily duties. There
is minimal adult supervision after the child begins to walk; how-
ever children tend to be supervised collectively by the adults and
older children in the village. Aside from collective games around
balls and very few other shared objects, these children develop in
a culture that does not emphasize individual possession. Children
toys are rare in the Samoan context that emphasizes communal
properties and living space, rather than individual possession and
private quarters.
METHODOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS AND PARTICIPANTS
We tried to replicate with Samoan 5- to 6-year-old children the
multi-round, triadic sharing game with stingy and generous pup-
pets as well as the costly punishment task described in Study 2. In
Samoa we used materials that were more familiar to the partici-
pants such that children split buttons between two sock puppets,
props that were meant to be culturally less eccentric than the poker
coins and the high-quality plush puppets used with the US chil-
dren. Consistent with Studies 1–4, children were informed that,
like the coins, buttons were valuable placeholders to be redeemed
at a makeshift toy store at the game’s conclusion. Figure 6 depicts
a child tested in Samoa.
We tested a 14 children (seven male and seven female, see
Table 1). All children were tested by a trained adult native from
the village who was ﬂuent in Samoan language. Back translations
of the Samoan Experimenter’s instructions to the child were per-
formed to ensure consistency and comparability between Samoan
and English.
FIGURE 6 | Experimental situation in Samoa.The plush puppets and
poker chips used for the American samples were replaced with more
culturally familiar items (sock puppets and buttons).
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RESULTS
For the triadic sharing game, the number of buttons (out
of nine) distributed to each player was analyzed using a 4
(round)× 3 (recipient) repeated measures ANOVA. Gender and
performance on the three-way pre-test were not included as fac-
tors because there was very little variation in sharing between
males and females, and all but 1 child in the Samoan sample
shared coins equitably at pre-test. Similarly, because our sam-
ple was limited to 5-year-olds, age was not factored into the
analysis.
We observed a main effect of recipient, F2,12 = 4.86,
p = 0.029, η2 = 0.442. Pairwise comparisons indicate that in gen-
eral, unlike American children, Samoan children gave fewer
coins to themselves (M ± SD= 2.29± 0.282) than to either
the stingy puppet (M ± SE= 3.46± 0.265) or the generous
puppet (M ± SD= 3.21± 0.175), both p< 0.05 (Bonferroni-
adjusted). Also in contrast to the American 5-year-olds
of Study 2, our Samoan sample did not discriminate
between the two puppets, giving roughly the same num-
ber of coins to both generous and stingy protagonists,
MD± SE=−0.167± 0.241.
With regard to costly punishment, Samoan 5-year-olds opted
to punish at chance levels: Eight children (57%) engaged in costly
sacriﬁce whereas six children (43%) did not, both p> 0.05 based
on binomial tests. When they punished, children were also at
chance regarding who should be punished, with approximately
half of the children punishing stingy alone, and half punishing
both characters.
DIRECT COMPARISON WITH THE US SAMPLE
We compared our sample of Samoan 5-year-olds (Figure 7, left
panel) to age and gender-matched, randomly chosen 5-year-olds
from our sample of American children in Study 2 (seven males
and seven females, see Table 1).
Regarding the triadic share (see Figure 7), we computed
a “self-maximizing” score for our matched sample of Samoan
and American 5-year-olds by averaging the number of coins
distributed to the self across the four sharing rounds. This
score was then used in an independent samples t -test. Results
show that American children gave themselves signiﬁcantly
more coins (M ± SD= 4.70± 1.55) than did Samoan children
(M ± SD= 2.29± 0.976), t 26 = 4.55, p< 0.01(one-tailed).
FIGURE 7 | Samoan andAmerican 5-year-olds’ distributions in triadic
sharing in Study 6.Vertical axis represents mean number of coins (maximum
9) distributed by Samoan children (left panel) versus a randomly selected
sample of age and gender-matched children from Study 2 (right panel) to each
protagonist (child, left puppet, right puppet) as a function of round (1–4). The
horizontal line represents absolute equity (three coins). Bars represent ±1 SE.
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Samoan 5-year-olds also differed in their treatment of the
two puppets. We analyzed the number of coins distributed
to protagonists in a 4 (round)× 2 (recipient: stingy or gen-
erous)× 2 (culture) mixed-design ANOVA, ﬁnding a signiﬁ-
cant interaction of culture and recipient, F1,26 = 8.31, p = 0.027,
η2 = 0.225. Across the four sharing rounds, American children
preferentially shared with the generous over the stingy pup-
pet, MD± SE= 0.492± 0.176, p< 0.01 (based on Bonferroni-
adjusted pairwise comparisons). In contrast, although Samoan
children gave slightly more coins to the stingy puppet, the mean
difference in the number of coins distributed to the puppets was
non-signiﬁcant, MD± SE=−0.167± 0.241. Samoan children
did not preferentially share with either puppet.
With regard to costly punishment, a Fisher’s exact test reveals a
non-signiﬁcant trend of more American children (86%, N = 12)
opting to punish compared to 57% (N = 8) of Samoan children.
When children agreed to give up coins to punish, the percent-
age sacriﬁced to punish the stingy puppet did not differ signif-
icantly across cultures, M ± SD= 0.817± 0.333 for the US and
M ± SD= 0.576± 0.348 for Samoa, based on an independent
t -test: t 18 = 1.48, p> 0.05. However, when examining each cul-
ture independently, only US children were above chance levels
(p = 0.005) in choosing to punish, based on binomial tests. These
ﬁnding suggests that although punishment may be less common
in Samoa, when punishment does occur, like in the US, it tends
to be oriented more toward the stingy puppet. However, note
that because of the small sample size, there might be insufﬁcient
power to detect a statistically signiﬁcant difference between the
two cultures. Alternatively, Samoan children may be less inclined
to punish, but also less inclined to engage in strong reciprocity ori-
ented toward a protagonist who has violated an expected norm of
fairness. It is possible that norms of fairness might differ between
Samoan and US children. More research is necessary to further
assess the relative universality of strong reciprocity, with a focus
on the relationship between cultural context and the inclination
to selectively punish. This said, our preliminary investigation con-
ﬁrms that there might be important, yet subtle cross-cultural
differences.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
Collectively, our ﬁndings provide ﬁrst evidence that what we con-
strue as strong reciprocity emerges by 5 years in human ontogeny,
at least in middle class US children. Although 3-year-olds mod-
ulate their tendency toward self-maximizing depending on the
relative generosity or stinginess of sharing partners, this early sen-
sitivity is not yet principled. In 3-year-olds, there are no apparent
signs of selective costly punishment. Our research suggests that
signs of strong reciprocity emerge from 5 years of age.
Furthermore, our analysis shows that a simple aversion to
inequity cannot account for what we observe. If some sensitiv-
ity to inequity is necessary for the expression strong reciprocity, is
not sufﬁcient. In the expression of strong reciprocity as construed
here, individuals not only detect but also tend to act principally
upon it by either punishing or rewarding, even if doing so comes
at a personal cost. The developing propensity to act, even at a
personal cost, captures ﬁrst signs of an ethical, morally principled
stance emerging by 5 years of age and not earlier.
The results of the triadic sharing game in Studies 1 and 2 suggest
that although children in both age groups express self-maximizing
tendencies, only 5-year-olds demonstrate evidence of reciprocity
by discriminating between the generous and stingy puppets, opt-
ing to givemore coins to the generous puppet and reducing payoffs
to the stingy puppet over the four rounds of sharing. In the two
follow-up control conditions, 5-year-olds showed further signs
of reciprocity by decreasing their self-maximizing behavior when
sharing with identical generous puppets (Study 3) and increas-
ing this self-maximization when interacting with identical stingy
puppets (Study 4). When sharing with non-agentive characters
(Study 5), 5-year-olds self-maximized their payoffs (though to a
lesser extent than in Studies 1 and 2) and did not discriminate
signiﬁcantly between the“stingy”and“generous”protagonistswho
were passive actors and recipients in the game.
Study 2 provides further evidence that although children of
both age groups engage in costly punishment, only 5-year-olds
show signs of strong reciprocity by orienting their costly sacri-
ﬁce markedly more toward the stingy protagonist. Three-year-old
children do not align punishment with either character, engaging
in indiscriminate punishment that may be more about contin-
uing the inertia of the game rather than conveying approval or
disapproval for the puppets’ actions. Selective costly punishment
was only observed in conditions where children interacted with
both an agentive stingy and an agentive generous protagonist. In
control conditions where puppets were either identically generous
(Study 3) or identically stingy (Study 4), both 3- and 5-year-olds
were at chance with regard to the inclination to punish, and to
orient punishment toward a particular protagonist. In the third
control condition (Study 5), when the puppets were non-agentive
and the distribution pre-established, 5-year-olds were signiﬁcantly
less inclined to punish only one of the two puppets,whether stingy
or generous. In thus appears that by 5 years, children show signif-
icantly more signs of strong reciprocity. Our analyses also show
that such signs of strong reciprocity cannot be merely reduced to
an expression of inequity aversion. By 5 years, the costly behav-
ior of the tested children cannot be predicted by the unequal
accumulation of coins at the end of the triadic share. Instead,
the inclination to engage in costly sacriﬁce seems to depend on
the relative character of the child’s sharing partners (i.e., stingy
versus generous), particularly so when these partners behave as
agents.
With regard to the relative universality and cross-cultural
equivalence in the expression of strong reciprocity in ontogeny,
a comparison of age-matched Samoan and American children
(Study 6) suggests that the proclivity to engage in costly pun-
ishment is at 5 years of age more prevalent in the US com-
pared to Samoa. Although further research is needed, our data
suggest that culture could play a role in the expression of an
ethical stance in child development. The collectivist, more group-
oriented culture surrounding Samoan compared to US children,
and particularly compared to the middle class US sample tested
here, might impact their developing sense of fairness expressed
in distributive justice. Samoan 5-year-old children did show a
heightened tendency toward egalitarianism and lesser propen-
sity toward self-maximizing in the context of our triadic sharing
game.
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Questions remain as to what factors contribute to such devel-
opment. Recent research suggests that concern for others in dis-
tributive justice games may be determined in part by parochialism
and close relations (Fehr et al., 2008; Olson and Spelke, 2008).
Favoritism toward perceived in-group members becomes a major
predictors of fair distributions, particularly in children 5 years and
older. The relationship between the development such distribu-
tive behavior and so-called moral emotions (e.g., spite, altruism)
would need to be further investigated. Finally, evidence of third-
party punishment (e.g., costly sacriﬁce to punish one who has
wronged another) in 5-year-old children could strengthen they
ethical stance hypothesis proposed here.
CONCLUSION
Beyond the speculation that humans might be born with a unique,
species-speciﬁc “moral instinct,” our own research points toward
the importance of examining the role of culture in the expres-
sion of such fair-minded behavior and the child’s ability to adopt
an ethical stance. Preliminary cross-cultural differences reported
here, although limited, point to various possibilities. For example,
Samoan and US middle class cultures might be associated with
different developmental trajectories regarding the emergence of
strong reciprocity. Alternatively, children of both cultures might
express strong reciprocity at about the same age, but in differ-
ent ways reﬂecting, for example, their relative inclination toward
social conformity, their relative respect for rules and adult author-
ity (Keller et al., 2004), as well as their greater sense of fairness
and aversion toward inequality (Fehr et al., 2008; Rochat et al.,
2009).
We conclude that strong reciprocity as the putative force behind
human cooperation, as well as the human tendency to abide by
and enforce social norms, might ﬁrst emerge by 5 years of age and
may depend on culture. From then on, children begin to situate
themselves, their understandings, judgments, and actions toward
others in a morally principled space (Taylor, 1989). This, we pro-
pose, represents a radical ontogenetic shift that is deserving of
further empirical scrutiny.
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